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1. Introduction 
 
Central banks around the globe – including the Federal Reserve (Fed) in U.S. – used non-standard 
monetary policy interventions after the 2007-09 global financial crisis (Fratzscher et al., 2012). As a result, 
yields on government and corporate bonds have decreased in major developed economies, making it 
harder for investors in bond markets to generate returns. It is often reported that declining rates can 
incentivize investors to increase the holdings of higher-yielding but riskier securities, which is commonly 
referred to as “reaching for yield”. (see, e.g., Choi and Kronlund, 2015; Di Maggio and Kacperczyk, 2017) 
Rajan (2015) suggests that emerging markets might be the most exposed to the increased risk-taking. 
Foreign policymakers – particularly in emerging markets – have criticized the Fed’s policies, 
arguing that they have caused large capital flows to emerging market economies (EMEs) since 2009 
(Fratzscher et al., 2012; Ahmed and Zlate, 2014). Importantly, stimulus is not a free lunch, and 
macroeconomic disruptions may arise when monetary policy is lifted (Feroli et al., 2014).  
Shin (2013) distinguishes between two recent phases of “global liquidity”, the first one lasting 
from 2003-08 and the second phase – which is especially present in the market for emerging market debt 
securities – starting in 2010. During the first phase, the focus was on global banks transmitting loose 
financial conditions across borders via banking capital flows. In the second phase, banks have been 
constrained by regulation, and have thereby given way to asset managers. Also Goldstein et al. (2017) 
discuss how regulation of other players in the financial industry is likely to increase activity in mutual 
funds, raising an important question over their fragility.  
While inflows to fixed income mutual funds have grown rapidly in recent years (Feroli et al., 
2014), the literature on flows in bond mutual funds is still limited (Christoffersen et al., 2014). This paper 
aims to complement the existing literature on U.S. monetary policy spillovers as well as mutual fund 
fragility by doing an empirical study on emerging market debt (EMD) mutual funds based in the U.S. 
First, I will study how sensitive the fund flows in my sample were of the LSAP announcements 
made during 2008-2014. Importantly, I do not include only the announcements related to the extensions 
of the programs, but also the tapering of LSAPs. This allows me to investigate how sensitive EMD mutual 
funds are to expansive monetary policies as well as a reversal in risk appetite. Second, I will study the 
flow-to-performance relation in my sample funds to see whether it shows signs of fragility. Third, I will 
further examine how the flow-to-performance relation changes during the three phases of QE to 
understand whether it increases the incentives for asset managers to reach for yield. Lastly, I will 
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investigate whether the funds that experienced larger inflows during QE show greater fragility when the 
monetary policy is tightened. 
My key findings can be summarized as follows. First, inflows to EMD mutual funds are largely 
affected by the Fed’s announcements related to both the expansion and tapering of LSAPs. Second, EMD 
mutual funds are more sensitive of outflows to bad past performance than of inflows to good past 
performance – i.e., their flow-to-performance relation is more concave. However, the sensitivity of bad 
performance weakens during Quantitative Easing (QE), which might increase the incentives for asset 
managers to reach for yield.  In contrary, when monetary policy is lifted, the sensitivity of poor 
performance strengthens. Furthermore, the sensitivity is greater for the funds that experienced excessive 
flows during QE. These findings point to a potential fragility in EMD mutual funds. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents previous literature. Section 3 describes the 
institutional background and states the main hypotheses. Section 4 describes the data and methodology. 
Section 5 presents and discusses the main results. Section 6 concludes.  
2. Literature review 
 
Previous literature shows that flows between mutual funds and investors are both a cause and 
outcome in a complex web of decisions (Chistoffersen et al., 2014). In mutual funds, the manager 
compensation and investor flows are both sensitive to fund returns and therefore, managers have an 
incentive to boost returns. Whereas the existence of flow-to-performance relation is generally a good thing 
(Chevalier and Ellison, 1997), it may also result in risk-taking behavior, i.e. reaching for yield (Rajan, 
2005). 
While equity mutual funds are widely documented to be very sensitive to good past performance, 
i.e., exhibit a convex flow-to-performance relation (see, e.g., Chevalier and Ellison, 1997; Brown et al., 
1996), Goldstein et al. (2017) find that the relation for corporate bond funds is concave. In other words, 
corporate bond investors are more sensitive to bad performance than to good performance. Furthermore, 
they are more sensitive to underperformance as portfolio and market liquidity gets worse, which points to 
a potential fragility in corporate bond funds.  
The flow-to-performance relation of a mutual fund is connected to managerial incentives. When 
the relation is more convex, i.e., investor flows are very sensitive of good past performance, managers are 
more incentivized to take on excess risk in order to generate better returns and attract investor flows. 
(Chevalier and Ellison, 1997) Rajan (2005) suggests that these incentives should be a concern under 
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certain situations. Indeed, previous literature widely argues that reaching for yield may be more present 
in a low-interest-rate environment, as market participants are willing to take on more risk (see, e.g., 
Acharaya and Naqvi, 2016; Choi and Kronlund, 2016). 
Feroli et al. (2014) focus on market tantrums and study whether potential non-bank channels of 
financial instability exist by investigating fixed income mutual fund flows. They find that flows into and 
out of bond funds seem to aggravate and be aggravated by changes in bond prices, potentially creating 
instability in the industry. They point out that whereas banks have been regulated, the instability caused 
by non-banks does not yet have a simple cure. Indeed, their results suggest that unconventional monetary 
policies can encourage certain types of risk-taking, which can result in future hazards.  
There are also several studies confirming that EME inflows have been affected by the LSAPs 
implemented by the Federal Reserve. One of the papers providing evidence on this is by Fratzscher et al. 
(2012), who find that U.S. unconventional monetary policy measures have had an effect on capital flows 
to EMEs in a pro-cyclical manner. Specifically, the first phase of LSAPs, introduced in late 2008 as a part 
of unconventional monetary policy tools, caused flows out of EMEs into U.S. equity and bond funds. In 
contrary, the direction was the opposite under the second phase. The findings of Ahmed and Zlate (2014) 
and Tillmann (2016) also confirm that U.S. unconventional monetary policy is one among a number of 
important factors affecting EME inflows. 
 One relevant study that discusses the effects of market tantrums on EMEs is by Ahmed et al. 
(2017). They find that financial conditions deteriorated in EMEs during summer 2013, during an event 
commonly referred to as “taper tantrum”. The Fed chairman Ben Bernanke suggested that the Fed might 
slow down the pace of large-scale asset purchase programs (LSAPs), and it led to a sharp rise in both the 
U.S. and EME bond yields. This triggered portfolio adjustments, causing significant outflows from EMEs 
to the U.S. (Ahmed et al., 2017; World Bank, 2014). Specifically, the findings of Ahmed et al. (2017) 
suggest that the effects were greater in those countries that had earlier experienced greater private capital 
inflows and exchange rate appreciation.  
Several studies have also investigated the effects of EME inflows to issues such as currency 
appreciation, excessive credit issuance and changes in yields (see, e.g., Ahmed and Zlate, 2014; Fratzscher 
et al., 2012). However, my paper does not attempt to measure in detail the impact EMD mutual fund flows 
have on U.S. and EM economies or market prices – importantly, it is worth noting that EMD funds form 
just a small share of the total capital flows to EMEs.  
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3. Institutional background and hypotheses development 
 
 In this section, I first present the institutional background and then continue to hypothesis 
development. 
 
3.1. Institutional background 
IMF’s Global Financial Stability report (2015) documents that recently, mutual funds have been 
increasing their portfolio weights in less liquid assets, including emerging market assets. Fig.1 confirms 
the rapid growth of the EMD mutual funds.  
 
 
The cumulative fund flows have grown quite steadily since the financial crisis, until the events of summer 
2013. This raises an interesting question over EMD mutual fund sensitivity of the unconventional 
monetary policies implemented by the Fed.   
Fig. 1 Cumulative net dollar flows to emerging market debt mutual funds. This figure plots the net cumulative dollar 
flows to emerging market debt mutual funds over the period 2008 to 2016. I exclude index funds and exchange traded 
funds from the CRSP mutual fund database. The grey and yellow areas represent announcements related to the expansion 
and tapering of LSAPs. QE1, QE2, and QE3 represent the dates the three programs were first announced. Taper tantrum 
refers to the events of Summer 2013, and Phase out marks the date the programs were halted (see Table 1 in Appendix for 
details). 
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Even though the growth has been considerably large, the flows to EMD mutual funds have also 
been rather volatile. Fig. 2 visualizes this. It shows the total net assets and net dollar flows of the EMD 
mutual funds in my sample. As of January 2008, the total net assets invested in EMD funds were $20 
billion, and in April 2013 – just before the taper tantrum – the figure had grown over fivefold up to $112 
billion, reaching its peak. In the end of my sample period, December 2016, total net assets were equal to 
$83 billion.  
 
 
 
 
 
In order to better understand the factors affecting the flow-to-performance relation in bond mutual 
funds, it is worth noting the liquidity mismatch in investor flows. When a bond mutual fund experiences 
net outflows, it is forced to liquidate holdings, which can be costly. Whereas exiting investors get their 
money as of the day of redemption, the portfolio adjustments may occur later due to the illiquidity of 
bonds. As all investors trade at the same price, i.e., the net asset value per share, withdrawing money out 
Fig. 2 Total net assets and net dollar flows of active emerging market debt funds. This figure shows total net assets 
(TNA) and net dollar flows of actively managed emerging market debt funds from 2008 to 2016. I exclude index funds, 
exchange traded funds and exchange traded notes from the CRSP mutual fund database. The grey and yellow areas represent 
announcements related to the expansion and tapering of LSAPs. QE1, QE2, and QE3 represent the dates the three programs 
were first announced. Taper tantrum refers to the events of Summer 2013, and Phase out marks the date the programs were 
halted (see Table 1 in Appendix for details). 
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of a mutual fund will largely be reflected in future net asset values, creating negative externalities to other 
investors. This liquidity mismatch causes a first-mover advantage in the withdrawing decision and 
possibly leads to a ‘run risk’: If investors expect others to withdraw their money, they might have a greater 
incentive to redeem their shares. (Christoffersen, 2014; Goldstein et al., 2017) The liquidity mismatch is 
particularly central for EMD mutual funds, as they tend to hold more illiquid assets.  
 
3.2.Hypotheses development 
 
Since the U.S. unconventional monetary policy has played a role in the inflows to EMEs (Ahmed 
and Zlate, 2014; Fratzscher et al., 2012; Tillmann, 2016) and also mutual funds have experienced 
increasing flows during the recent years (Feroli et al., 2014), I expect the funds in my sample to experience 
flows sensitive to both the expansion and tapering of LSAPs. This leads to my first hypothesis.  
 
Hypothesis 1: LSAP announcements prompt shifts in bond market sentiment that move EMD mutual 
fund flows. 
 
EMD mutual funds tend to hold more illiquid assets compared to e.g. equity mutual funds. It makes 
the negative externalities of outflows stronger in my sample funds – similarly as for the corporate bond 
mutual funds studied by Goldstein et al (2017). This leads to my second hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 2: EMD mutual funds are more sensitive of outflows to bad performance than of inflows to 
good performance, i.e. they exhibit a concave flow-to-performance relationship. 
 
When QE is expanded, it should increase liquidity in the bond market. When liquidity is higher, 
the negative externalities should weaken, resulting in a lower sensitivity of outflows to bad performance. 
In contrast, the sensitivity should be stronger when the LSAPs are tapered, and the market overall is more 
illiquid. This leads to my third hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 3: The flow-to-performance relation of EMD mutual funds varies across different phases of 
QE.  
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My empirical tests will focus on these hypotheses and provide robustness tests to check whether the 
results hold. Next, I describe the data and empirical measurements used. 
4. Data description and empirical measurement 
 
4.1. Data and summary statistics 
 
I retrieve data on EMD mutual funds from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP), 
using the lipper objective code EMD to identify the funds in my sample. I exclude all index funds, 
exchange-traded funds and exchange-traded notes from my sample. I do empirical tests on fund share 
class level, and my data cover the period from January 2008 to December 2016. I exclude the funds that 
are under 1 years old or have TNA of less than $1 million.  
Table 1 presents the summary statistics for the funds in my sample from January 2008 to December 
2016. In total, my sample includes 321 different fund share classes and 102 unique funds. The average 
share class size is $362.1 million, and the average age equals 6.6 years. Over this sample period, active 
EMD funds record monthly returns of 0.3% and a monthly inflow of 1.5% on average. The average annual 
expense ratio is 1.2%.  
 
4.2. Empirical model and measurement 
 
My empirical approach for evaluating the impact of QE is to analyze the investor flow response 
after several LSAP announcements. My focus is on the effects of the three phases of LSAPs – commonly 
referred to as QE1, QE2 and QE3 – as well as the tapering of QE. All my empirical work relies on monthly 
data.  When looking at the effects of LSAP announcements on EMD mutual funds, I assume that the 
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change in expectations about future asset prices trigger changes in portfolio allocations, causing shifts in 
investor flows to EMD mutual funds. It is worth noting that the announcements do not indicate any change 
in the supply of e.g. U.S. Treasury securities at the time of the announcements. Instead, it will happen at 
some point in the future. (Fratzcher et al., 2012)  
 
4.2.1. Measurement of U.S. unconventional monetary policy 
 
 I study the effect of U.S. unconventional monetary policy on capital flows by focusing on LSAP 
announcements made by the Fed during 2008-2014. In my tests, I estimate the effect of 17 different events, 
which I divide into five different indicator variables to investigate whether the fund flows are unusual 
during the events. I list the events and variables in Table 1 in Appendix. The variables equal 1 for the 
months when the programs were announced, extended, or tapered. One exception is taper tantrum, which 
equals 1 also in July and August 2013, even though the announcements were made in May and June. The 
reason for this is that it is widely reported that the stress in the market persisted for much of the summer, 
until the Fed decided to leave the asset purchase pace unchanged in September (Ahmed et al. 2017). Thus, 
to make my study consistent with previous literature, it is reasonable to date the taper tantrum from May 
to August.  
 
4.2.2. Measurement of flow  
 
Following Goldstein et al. (2017), I calculate net fund flows from the total net assets of each fund 
share class between consecutive points in time and the interim net portfolio return. Specifically, flow for 
fund k in month t is defined as: 
 
𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑘,𝑡 =  
𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑘,𝑡 −  𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑘,𝑡−1(1 + 𝑅𝑘,𝑡)
𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑘,𝑡−1
           (1) 
 
where Rk,t is the return of fund k during month t, and TNAk,t is the total net asset value at the end of month 
t. I winsorize the flows at 1 and 99% to eliminate the funds with exceptionally large changes in TNA. 
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4.2.3. Measurement of performance 
 
As a measure of performance, I use an EMD mutual fund’s average alpha in the past year by 
performing rolling-window time-series regressions for each fund using 12 past months of data. Finding 
the benchmark relative to which performance is measured has no one solution. For the best estimate, I 
calculate Alpha as the intercept from a regression of excess fund returns on excess aggregate bond market, 
aggregate stock market, and aggregate EM returns. I use the Vanguard total bond market index fund return, 
CRSP value-weighted market return and MSCI EM index return to proxy for aggregate bond, stock, and 
emerging market returns. My measure of performance is thus closely similar to the one used by Goldstein 
et al. (2017), but I further include a benchmark for overall emerging market returns to also adjust for the 
exposures to emerging market risks. 
5. Results  
 
5.1. Flow sensitivity of LSAPs in EMD mutual funds 
 
 I begin my flow analysis by identifying whether the EMD mutual fund flows in my sample are 
sensitive of LSAP announcements made during 2008-2014. To this end, I estimate the regression model 
of monthly fund net flows (Fund flow) on the announcements related to the QE programs (Event) over my 
sample period of 2008-2016.  
 
𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑘,𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛼1𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡 +  𝑏𝑋𝑘,𝑡−1 + 𝛾1𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑡−1 +  𝛾2𝑇𝑆𝑡−1 + 𝛾3𝑀𝑆𝐶𝐼𝑡−1 +  𝜀𝑘,𝑡 
with 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡 = [𝑄𝐸1𝑡, 𝑄𝐸2𝑡 , 𝑄𝐸3𝑡 , 𝑇𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑚𝑡, 𝑃ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒 𝑜𝑢𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑄𝐸𝑡]             
 
 In the regression, I include the following control variables (subsumed by vector X): the natural log 
of fund size (Log(TNA)), the expense ratio (Expense), the natural log of fund age (Log(Age)), lagged flows 
(Lagged fund flow) and lagged returns (Lagged fund return). I also include measures for global risk 
aversion (VIX), as well as term spread (TS), calculated as a difference between the 10-year and 3-month 
U.S. Treasury yield, to capture the effect of other time-varying variables except LSAPs. Additionally, I 
include the MSCI EM Index return (MSCI) to control flows driven by overall emerging market 
performance. The dependent variable is defined as in Eq. (1). All control variables are measured at the 
end of month t-1.  
(2) 
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There are some concerns I want to point out. The Fed announcements and operations may have 
been anticipated by financial markets. In this case, investor flows may have to some extent adjusted 
already ahead of the events. By contrast, the flows may not fully reflect in the flows on the month the 
event occurred, and there might be a lagged reaction in the markets. Therefore, I do robustness tests where 
the indicator variable for different events equals 1 also one month prior and after the event. For robustness, 
I also introduce fund fixed effects. I report all the results in Table 2. 
 
The findings overall give support to my first hypothesis, suggesting that EMD mutual funds’ 
investor flows are sensitive of the LSAP announcements made by the Fed. The announcement of QE1 
caused net outflows from the funds included in my sample. The result is consistent with Fratzscher et al. 
(2012), who study the first and second rounds of QE, and find that QE1 caused a portfolio rebalancing out 
of EMEs into U.S. funds. In contrast, QE2 and QE3 resulted in statistically significant inflows to the funds 
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in my sample. The reaction to QE2 is also in line with the findings of Fraztscher at al. (2012). During 
taper tantrum, the funds in my sample experienced statistically significant outflows, and the reaction was 
similar when the Fed purchases were tapered. 
The findings on my robustness tests suggest that the market already anticipated most of the events. 
Additionally, most of the events were not fully reflected on investor flows at time t, when the 
announcements were made, but also had a lagged reaction. The results are also robust after introducing 
fund fixed effects. In general, the findings suggest that EMD funds are sensitive to both the expansion and 
tapering of QE, providing evidence on the spillovers of U.S. unconventional monetary policies to EMEs. 
They also suggest that asset managers do play a role in the second phase of global liquidity described by 
Shin (2013).  
Interestingly, the CBOE Volatility Index, known by VIX, has a positive effect on the fund flows 
prior to introducing fund fixed effects, even though it is widely used as a proxy for global risk aversion in 
the market. As VIX is constructed using the implied volatilities of S&P 500 index options, one explanation 
for this is that when the volatility in the U.S. market is higher, the contrast between the U.S. and EMEs is 
not that big, causing investors to increase their holdings in emerging markets.  
 
5.2. Flow-to-performance relation for EMD mutual funds 
 
 Next, I test whether EMD funds exhibit stronger sensitivity of outflows to bad performance than 
of inflows to good performance. First, I present a semi-parametric model of fund flows on past fund 
performance. Then, I find further support for my results by estimating a parametric model.  Throughout 
my analysis, I also use several subsamples to identify the changes in the flow-to-performance relation 
across different phases of QE. Lastly, I examine whether the funds that experience excessive flows during 
periods of QE exhibit greater fragility when the programs are tapered. 
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5.2.1. The semi-parametric model 
 
To begin, I estimate a semi-parametric regression of fund flows on past fund performance, making my 
method similar to previous studies (Goldstein et al, 2017; Chevalier and Ellison, 1997). My semi-
parametric regression is specified as follows: 
 
𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑘,𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝑓(𝐴𝑙𝑝ℎ𝑎𝑘,𝑡−12→𝑡−1) +  𝑏𝑋𝑘,𝑡−1 + 𝛾1𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑡−1 +  𝛾2𝑇𝑆𝑡−1 + 𝛾3𝑀𝑆𝐶𝐼𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑘,𝑡     (3) 
  
where 𝐴𝑙𝑝ℎ𝑎𝑘,𝑡−12→𝑡−1  is fund k’s alpha estimated as the intercept from a regression of excess fund returns 
on excess aggregate EM, aggregate bond, and aggregate stock market return in the past one year. 
Dependent and other independent variables are defined as in Eq. (1) and (2), but lagged fund returns are 
excluded. I winsorize the alphas at 1 and 99 % to exclude the outliers. 
To see whether the flow-to-performance relation varies across different periods of unconventional 
monetary policy, I further divide my data in three subsamples. I use the QE and tapering periods to capture 
liquid and illiquid periods in the emerging bond markets, respectively. QE includes events 1-13, whereas 
tapering period includes events 14-17 (see Table 1 in Appendix). The periods include the observations 
during announcement months t as well as t+1, to control for the lagged reaction in the market. Non-QE 
period includes the months outside of the QE period.  
Fig. 3. shows the results. It implies that overall, EMD mutual funds exhibit a stronger sensitivity of 
outflows to bad performance than of inflows to good performance, providing initial support for my second 
hypothesis. This is in line with the concave flow-to-performance shape of corporate bond funds 
investigated by Goldstein et al. (2017). However, whereas the concavity in my sample funds starts at the 
positive domain, for corporate bond funds, it starts already at the negative domain.  
Additionally, the results suggest that the flow-to-performance varies across different phases of QE. 
When the LSAPs are announced or extended, the shape of the flow-to-performance relation changes, 
suggesting that investor flows to EMD funds are less sensitive to bad performance. In contrary, when the 
policy is lifted, the sensitivity of poor performance further strengthens, and the concavity already starts at 
the negative domain. Thus, the results also give support to my third hypothesis. 
  
 14 
 
  
Whole period QE period 
Tapering period 
F
lo
w
 
F
lo
w
 
F
lo
w
 
Performance Performance 
Fig. 3 Flow-to-performance relation for individual emerging market debt funds. This figure shows the flow-to-
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fund alpha and fund characteristics including fund size, fund age, expense ratio, lagged flows, and lagged returns as well 
as time-dependent variables including VIX, term spread and lagged MSCI EM Index returns. The shaded areas represent 
standard errors. 
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5.2.2. The parametric model 
 
As Goldstein et al. (2017) note, the semi-parametric approach has rather low statistical power due 
to the flexible functional specification. To formally test hypothesis 2, I estimate the following parametric 
regression that captures a potential non-linearity in the flow-to-performance relation: 
 
𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑘,𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽1𝐴𝑙𝑝ℎ𝑎𝑘,𝑡−12→𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐴𝑙𝑝ℎ𝑎𝑘,𝑡−12→𝑡−1  
×  𝐼(𝐴𝑙𝑝ℎ𝑎𝑘,𝑡−12→𝑡−1 < 0)  +  𝛽3𝐼(𝐴𝑙𝑝ℎ𝑎𝑘,𝑡−12→𝑡−1 < 0) +  𝑏𝑋𝑘,𝑡−1
+ 𝛾1𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑡−1 +  𝛾2𝑇𝑆𝑡−1 + 𝛾3𝑀𝑆𝐶𝐼𝑡−1 +  𝜀𝑘,𝑡 
 
where 𝐼(𝐴𝑙𝑝ℎ𝑎𝑖,𝑡−12→𝑡−1 < 0) is an indicator variable equal to one if the fund achieves a negative alpha 
in the past year and zero otherwise, and the dependent and other control variables are defined as in previous  
equations. Again, I further divide my data in three subsamples: QE, non-QE, and tapering periods, which 
are defined similarly as before. 
The results are reported in Table 3. They give further support for my second hypothesis, indicating 
that EMD mutual funds exhibit a concave flow-to-performance relation. For robustness, I conduct several 
tests with different measures of alpha, and find that the flow-to-performance relation in EMD mutual 
funds overall is always concave or linear. The concavity is also robust after introducing fund fixed effects. 
The results are left unreported in order to conserve space.  
For the whole period, the slope coefficient for Alpha is 0.593, and the slope coefficient for Alpha 
interacted with Alpha < 0 is 0.892. Thus, the sensitivity of outflows to negative alpha is 1.485 (0.593 + 
0.892), which is 2.50 times that of sensitivity of inflows to positive alpha (0.593). The results are 
statistically significant. When the periods of QE are excluded, the sensitivity of outflows to negative alpha 
is 1.418, 2.05 times greater than the sensitivity of inflows to positive alpha (0.695). 
The results also further support my third hypothesis. The flow-to-performance relation changes 
during the QE period: the sensitivity of outflows to negative alpha is -0.952, and the sensitivity of inflows 
to positive alpha 0.659. The negative coefficient of alpha interacted with Alpha < 0 is not significant, but 
the greater sensitivity of outflows to negative alpha disappears. In contrast, the sensitivity further 
strengthens during tapering of QE. The sensitivity of inflows to positive alpha is 0.173, whereas the 
sensitivity of outflows to negative alpha is 10.433. The noticeably high sensitivity might be due to the size 
of the subsample, which is rather small.  
(4) 
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To further support my results, I estimate the following regression with a subsample of 
underperforming funds, i.e. funds with a negative alpha: 
 
𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑘,𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑙𝑝ℎ𝑎𝑘,𝑡−12→𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐴𝑙𝑝ℎ𝑎𝑘,𝑡−12→𝑡−1 × 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑡 +  𝛽3𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑡
+ 𝑏𝑋𝑘,𝑡−1 + 𝛾1𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑡−1 +  𝛾2𝑇𝑆𝑡−1 + 𝛾3𝑀𝑆𝐶𝐼𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑘,𝑡, ∀𝐴𝑙𝑝ℎ𝑎𝑘,𝑡−12→𝑡−1 < 0 
 
where 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑡  is an indicator variable that represents different periods of QE. It equals to one during the 
periods of QE and tapering, which are defined similarly as before, and zero otherwise. In addition, the 
dependent variable and control variables remain the same as before. The results are presented in Panel A 
(5) 
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in Table 4. Consistently with my previous findings, they confirm that the sensitivity of poor performance 
is greater during tapering periods, but the fund flows are not fragile when announcements regarding the 
expansion of QE are made. 
 Additionally, I estimate the same regression by using individual indicator variables as defined in 
Eq. (2) interacted with Alpha < 0.  The results are presented in Panel B in Table 4. They further suggest 
that EMD mutual funds were particularly fragile during tapering periods, especially taper tantrum, where 
the greater sensitivity of bad performance is statistically significant. 
 
5.2.3. Excessive flows 
 
To investigate whether the magnitude of fund flows received during periods of expansive monetary 
policy has an effect on the fragility of the funds, I estimate the following regression involving a triple 
interaction variable: 
 
𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑘,𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽1𝐴𝑙𝑝ℎ𝑎𝑘,𝑡−12→𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐴𝑙𝑝ℎ𝑎𝑘,𝑡−12→𝑡−1 ×  𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑠𝑘,𝑡
× 𝑇𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑡 +  𝛽3𝐴𝑙𝑝ℎ𝑎𝑘,𝑡−12→𝑡−1 × 𝑇𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑡
+ 𝛽4𝐴𝑙𝑝ℎ𝑎𝑘,𝑡−12→𝑡−1 × 𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑠𝑘,𝑡 + 𝑏𝑋𝑘,𝑡−1 + 𝛾1𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑡−1 +  𝛾2𝑇𝑆𝑡−1 
+ 𝛾3𝑀𝑆𝐶𝐼𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑘,𝑡, ∀𝐴𝑙𝑝ℎ𝑎𝑘,𝑡−12→𝑡−1 < 0 
 
where 𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑠𝑘,𝑡 is an indicator variable equal to one if the fund has attracted above-median 
flows during QE periods, and zero otherwise. The dependent and other independent variables are defined 
as in previous equations. In this regression, I also use the subsample of funds with a negative alpha. The 
results are presented in Table 5. 
The results suggest that the funds that attract above-median flows during QE, i.e., when the overall 
market is more liquid, are also more sensitive of bad performance when the policy is lifted. As such, the 
findings imply that the funds with excessive flows during expansive monetary policies are more fragile. 
However, there is a potential limitation to the current setting. The independent variable (Excessive flows) 
is mechanically correlated with the dependent variable during QE. Whether it has an effect on my triple 
interaction term (Alpha x Excessive Flows x Tapering period) is unclear, but deserves consideration. 
 
(6) 
 18 
 
 19 
 
5.3. Discussion of results 
 
Overall, the results show that the LSAP announcements do not only affect the investor flows of 
EMD mutual funds, but also change their flow-to-performance relation and thereby affect the managerial 
incentives, too. The findings in this paper thereby give insight on the fragility in EMD mutual funds, 
especially when market liquidity changes.  
A concave flow-to-performance relation in general suggests that managers are not that incentivized 
to take on excessive risk in order to achieve better returns, as the reward of doing that is not high enough. 
However, it raises a concern over the fragility of the funds. If investors rush to exit the funds following 
negative developments, it is possible that the effects of flows go beyond the fund itself, and e.g. start to 
push prices down (Goldstein et al., 2017). Thus, the flows can also have effects on the real economy. As 
my sample includes EMD mutual funds, the findings raise an important question especially on the 
implications for EMEs. However, my paper leaves that for future research. 
Interestingly, the findings suggest that investors are more sensitive of good past performance 
during QE. This suggests that EMD mutual fund managers’ incentives to reach for yield become greater 
during times of non-standard monetary policies. In contrast, during tapering periods – when overall market 
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is more illiquid – poor performance generates considerable outflows while good performance generates 
much milder inflows. Specifically, the fragility is greater for funds that experienced excessive flows 
during QE.  
The assessment of whether asset managers do engage in reaching for yield during expansive 
monetary policies, and whether it affects the fund flows, would make the analysis of EMD mutual funds’ 
fragility more thorough. However, due to data constraints, it is left out of the scope of this paper.   
It is also worth noting that Fed policies may not be the only factor influencing the investor flows. 
One example is the financial market turbulence in early 2014, when EM mutual funds were reported to 
have experienced a remarkably large flight by investors. Even though the market volatility followed 
several weeks after the FOMC meeting in December 2013, and there has been some debate over the causes 
of the sell-off, the meeting was still tied to the run out of EM funds. (Feroli et al., 2014) It should also be 
noted that even though the LSAPs were halted in October 2014, the Fed did not start the balance-sheet 
reduction during the sample period in this paper. Thus, the effects of phasing out of the QE programs 
might not have been fully reflected in the events the paper covers. 
 While the U.S. unconventional monetary policy is one of the many factors affecting EME flows, 
the results in this paper imply that the Fed announcements do cause significant changes in EMD mutual 
fund flows. Especially the fragility of EMD mutual funds deserve increased attention due to the funds’ 
rapid growth in recent years. 
6. Conclusion 
 
 The growth in bond mutual funds has been substantial in recent years. Additionally, capital flows 
to EMEs have increased. While the literature on EME flows is quite broad, the research on bond mutual 
funds is still very limited. This paper aims to give more insight on these topics by showing that flows to 
EMD mutual funds have been largely effected by U.S. unconventional monetary policies. The results also 
confirm that asset managers in mutual funds do play a significant role in transmitting the capital flows to 
EMEs.  
Additionally, the results show that EMD mutual funds exhibit a more concave flow-to-
performance relation, indicating a greater sensitivity of outflows to bad performance. The findings are 
consistent with recent literature, which suggests that corporate bond mutual fund outflows are more 
sensitive to poor performance than inflows to good performance. 
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I further show that the greater sensitivity of outflows to poor past performance disappears during 
periods of QE, increasing the incentives of asset managers to reach for yield. In contrast, the sensitivity of 
bad performance strengthens when the Fed either plans or decides to start the tapering of QE, i.e., when 
the market is more illiquid. Especially the funds that experience excessive flows during the periods of 
expansive monetary policy are more sensitive of bad performance during the tapering periods. 
The results point to a fragility in EMD mutual funds and adds to the discussion on the outcomes 
of unconventional monetary policies. Fragility of bond mutual funds and its implications to the real 
economy still requires future research. A better understanding on of how large a threat they pose to 
financial stability is needed – and not only in the U.S. It might provide answers for regulators on the 
tradeoff between expansive monetary policies and financial stability.  
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Appendix  
 
Table 1. List of QE events during 2008-2014. 
Date and QE 
phase 
Description of the event 
Indicator 
variable 
(1) QE1 
25/11/2008 
FOMC statement 
The first LSAP announcement. The Fed will purchase of $100 billion in 
government-sponsored enterprise (GSE) debt and up to $500 billion in 
mortgage-backed securities (MBS). 
QE1 
(2) QE1 
01/12/2008 
Bernanke Speech  
The Fed might purchase long-term Treasuries. 
QE1 
(3) QE1 
16/12/2008 
FOMC statement  
The FOMC assesses the potential benefits of purchasing longer-term Treasury 
securities.  
QE1 
(4) QE1 
28/01/2009 
FOMC statement  
The Fed is ready to expand agency debt and MBS purchases, and purchase 
long-term treasuries. 
QE1 
(5) QE1 
18/03/2009 
FOMC statement  
The Fed announces additional purchases of $750 billion in agency MBS and an 
additional $100 billion in Agency Debt. The FOMC decides to purchase up to 
$300 billion of longer-term Treasury securities. 
QE1 
(6) QE2 
10/08/2010 
FOMC statement  
The Fed will reinvest principal payments from agency debt and agency MBS in 
longer-term Treasury securities.  
QE2 
(7) QE2 
27/08/2010 
Bernanke speech  
Bernanke mentions a possibility for further easing, including further purchases 
of long-term securities. 
QE2 
(8) QE2 
15/10/2010 
Bernanke speech  
The Fed is prepared to provide more accommodation to support the economic 
recovery. 
QE2 
(9) QE2 
03/11/2010 
FOMC statement  
The Fed will purchase a further $600 billion of longer-term Treasury securities 
by the end of 2011:Q2, a pace of about $75 billion per month. 
QE2 
(10) QE2 
21/9/2011 
FOMC statement – “Operation Twist” 
The FOMC will sell $400 billion of short-term Treasuries and use the proceeds 
to buy $400 billion of long-term Treasuries. 
QE2 
(11) QE3 
31/8/2012 
Bernanke speech  
The Fed will provide additional accommodation. 
QE3 
(12) QE3 
13/09/2012 
FOMC statement  
The Fed will purchase $40 billion of MBS per month. 
QE3 
(13) QE3 
12/12/2012 
FOMC statement  
The Fed will increase the open-ended purchases from $40 billion to $85 billion 
per month. 
QE3 
(14) QE3 
22/05/2013 
Bernanke speech – Taper tantrum. 
Ben Bernanke addresses Congress’ Joint Economic Committee and mentions 
that the Fed may take a step down in the asset purchases during the next two 
meetings. 
Taper tantrum 
(15) QE3 
19/06/2013 
Bernanke speech – Taper tantrum. 
Bernanke says that Fed could scale back its bond purchases from $85 billion to 
$65 billion a month during the upcoming September 2013 policy meeting, also 
suggesting that the bond-buying program could be finished by mid-2014. 
Taper tantrum 
(16) QE 
18/12/2013 
FOMC statement – Tapering of QE. 
The Fed will start to taper its bond-buying program to $75 billion a month in 
January. FOMC also announces it will cut its monthly long-term Treasury bond 
purchases to $40 billion and mortgage-backed securities to $35 billion a month. 
Phase out of QE 
(17) QE3 
29/10/2014 
FOMC statement – Tapering of QE. 
Purchases are concluded after the Fed has accumulated over £3.5 trillion in 
assets on its balance sheet. 
Phase out of QE 
Source: The Federal Reserve 
 
